Delisa focuses her practice on workers’ compensation and employment law defense in Delaware. She represents employers, insurance carries and third-party administrators before the Industrial Accident Board and Delaware courts. She also has previous experience in commercial litigation and family law.
Delisa obtained a Bachelor of Law in the Dominican Republic, where she was a practicing attorney before moving to the United States in 2018. Delisa returned to law school to pursue her J.D. at Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law. While at Drexel, Delisa served as a Global JD Representative for the Student Bar Association and was the Secretary of the Latin American Law Student Association. She was the recipient of the Faculty Award for Outstanding Achievements in Legal Ethics and the CALI Excellence for the Future Award for excellent achievement in the study of Foundation of Legal Analysis, Legal Methods II, and International Business Transactions.
Delisa volunteered at Philadelphia VIP as an interpreter for Spanish-speaking clients during law school, and currently volunteers as a pro bono attorney for Spanish-speaking clients at Philadelphia VIP and Delaware Volunteer Legal Services.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Another Case of Superior Court Weighing the Facts Rather than Simply Examining the Record to Determine if Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Board’s Factual Findings and Conclusions?
June 8, 2026
In the May 2026 edition of What’s Hot, I highlighted a Delaware Supreme Court decision, Red House Motors v. Bayly, that reversed a Superior Court decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. In Franceschi-Rodriguez v. Perdue Foods, LLC, C.A. No. S25A-09-001 RHR (Del. Super. May 22, 2026), the court reversed the board’s decision, terminating claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The board terminated the claimant’s total disability benefits after determining that Franceschi was not prima facie a displaced worker. In reversing the board, the Franceschi court stated that the board’s decision that claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker was not supported by substantial evidence.Under Delaware law, once the board determines that a claimant is no longer totally medically disabled, the claimant can show continued entitlement to “economic” total disability benefits by showing prima facie displacement. In Franceschi, it was undisputed that the claimant was no longer totally medically disabled because he could perform sedentary work. In considering whether Franceschi was prima facie displaced and thus possibly entitled to ongoing “economic” total disability benefits, the board found that the claimant was a 58-year old male, had a four-year degree achieved in Puerto Rico in Spanish, had a ten-year work history in law enforcement in Puerto Rico, and was unable to communicate in English. It also found that, since being in the United States, he only performed construction or work for Perdue. After weighing the evidence before it, the board determined that the claimant was not prima facie displaced. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the board’s decision that the claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker. In so doing, the court appeared to weigh the facts differently than was done by the board. It held that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The Superior Court’s opinion largely emphasized the claimant’s language barrier and how his inability to speak, read, or write in English, combined with his inability to transfer his degree to Delaware without acquiring a local certification, rendered the claimant “effectively uneducated.” This finding by the Superior Court is contrary to the board’s weighing of the evidence presented during the hearing regarding the claimant’s mental capacity, education, and training that led the board to believe that the claimant “exhibited a host of skills beyond basic labor.” Given the foregoing, it appears that Franceschi may be another instance of the court substituting its factual findings for those of the board, instead of simply determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
