As a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, Corey focuses her practice on representing and defending insurance companies in insurance coverage disputes and first-party property litigation.
Corey is a 2005 graduate of Florida Atlantic University where she received her bachelors' degree in History and Political Science. She received her juris doctor in 2011 from Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center. While in law school, Corey was a subscriptions and articles editor for the ILSA Journal for International and Comparative Law. She also interned at the Broward County Court Family Law division under Judge Melinda Kirsch-Brown.
Outside of the office, Corey is a passionate ultra marathon runner. In May 2019, she was the #1 overall female finisher and the second overall finisher in the Dunes 50 Miler, an off-road running race in Hobe Sound, Florida. The course includes hard-packed single track trails and several miles of rolling loose sugar sand dunes. Corey finished the 50-mile course in a little over 14 hours.
Honors & Awards
•The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch, Insurance Law (2022-2025)
Published Works
•“Florida’s New Property Insurance Statute Changes Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs in First Party Homeowner’s Insurance Cases,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021
•'Help for Florida Insurers Drowning in Water Damage Claims,' Insurance Journal, Florida Edition, November 2019
•“Scope! Scope! Scope! Diaz v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company and Its Effect on the Insurer’s Option to Repair,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2017
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials
June 11, 2026
Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026).The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor. The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed.The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such. Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged. The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority. The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.” Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition. The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Sixth DCA Affirms Insureds May Present Replacement-Cost Evidence After Wrongful Claim Denial
March 1, 2026
Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez and Cuevas, Case No. 6D2024-1194, 2026 WL 370220 (Fla. 6th DCA Feb. 6, 2026).Universal issued a homeowners’ insurance policy to the plaintiffs, which provided replace cost value for covered damages. The subject policy stated it would pay, at the least, actual cash value of the loss less than any deductible, then pay any “remaining amounts necessary to perform such repairs as work is performed and expenses are incurred.” After issuance, the plaintiffs filed a claim for damages caused by a storm. Universal denied the claim for damage and the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. During trial, the plaintiffs testified that they did not make any repairs yet and, over Universal’s objection, presented a contractor’s estimate of the replacement cost value of the repairs necessary to fix the property. Universal argued that since no repairs had been made, the correct measure of damages was actual cash value, per the terms of the subject policy. The trial court overruled Universal’s objection to the replacement cost value estimate, presented and overruled a Motion of Limine and, after the jury ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, a motion for directed verdict regarding exclusion of the replacement cost value estimate. Universal appealed the decision.The Sixth DCA reviewed Florida Statute Section 627.7011(3)(a), which has similar language to Universal’s policy provision regarding replacement cost value and initially paying actual cash value. The court noted that the Second, Third, and Fourth DCAs had recently opined on the issue at hand: may policy language that allows a carrier to deny a claim, and, when an insured sues their carrier for coverage, bar the insured from presenting evidence of replacement cost value, as the policy initially requires payment of actual cash value? The Third DCA determined that an insured can present replacement cost value evidence, finding that Florida Statute 627.7011(3)(a) is based on the carrier providing coverage for the loss, not an insured suing their carrier for breach of contract after wrongfully denying the claim. The Fourth DCA came to the opposite conclusion. However, there was an important fact that the Fourth had to consider: the insureds sold their property without making any repairs. Thus, repairs by the insureds could never be made.The Sixth DCA followed the opinions of the Second and Third DCAs (and the dissenting opinion from the Fourth DCA), finding that the language of the policy and Florida Statute are for “covered property loss” not during litigation when a carrier has been accused of wrongfully denying a claim. While Universal argued that the opinion is in conflict with Citizens Prop. Ins. Co. v. Manor House, LLC, 313 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2021), the court explained that the specific issue in Manor House was extra-contractual consequential damages, not evidence of contractual damages. As a result, the decision was affirmed.
Marshall Dennehey Celebrates 25th Anniversary of Advanced Trial Advocacy & Mock Trial Program
July 15, 2025
