Seth is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice on representing and defending clients in insurance coverage, and first party property claims and suits made against them. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Seth served as in-house counsel for two separate insurance companies litigating first party property cases, and most recently, he also served as a member of the assignment of benefits and catastrophe (Hurricane) divisions. In addition to defending cases, Seth is also experienced in investigation, where he counseled and instructed his former claims departments in pre-suit matters.
In 2005 Seth received his juris doctor from Albany Law School, where he was an active participant in the Family Court Domestic Violence Clinic and Senior Prize Trials. After graduating from law school, Seth worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the Office of the Orange County, NY District Attorney for nearly a decade. During this time, Seth held positions in the Misdemeanor, General Crimes and Special Victims Units where he tried cases ranging from DWIs to Grand Larcenies to Sexual Assaults.
Seth moved to Florida in 2015 where he began a new chapter in his legal career, working in the insurance industry, initially representing his insurance carrier employers in coverage disputes and first-party-property-related claims and suits.
Results
Summary Judgment Secured in a Contentious Coverage Matter
We were granted summary judgment in a coverage matter. The plaintiff was seeking UM benefits for a policy he had on a car he owned for an accident that occurred when he was operating a motorcycle he owned, but did not insure. The court confirmed that the policy excluded underinsured motorist coverage for the plaintiff’s motorcycle. The issue was that the definition of “motor vehicle” for the other owned motor vehicle exclusion was not specifically provided in the policy. In the PIP coverage, the policy contained an exclusion for motorcycles because the definition said motor vehicles must have four wheels. The plaintiff argued that the same policy said a motorcycle was not a motor vehicle for PIP coverage, but was a motor vehicle for the other owned vehicle exclusion. This was an ambiguity in the policy that should be interpreted against the carrier. The plaintiff had significant injuries that far exceeded the value of the policy. The court upheld both exclusions and followed our argument that the PIP and UM portions of the policy are separate and distinct and that any definition in the PIP coverage did not necessarily apply to the UM coverage.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Third DCA Holds Presumption of Prejudice Applies to Any Post-Loss Obligation Defense When Insurer Establishes Insured’s Failure to Comply with Obligation
June 11, 2026
Universal Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v Alvarez, No.3D24-1853, Fla. 3d. DCA, May 13, 2026.At issue in this appeal was the trial court’s jury instruction regarding presumption of prejudice and post-loss obligation defenses. Alvarez filed a breach of contract action arising out of her insurance claim pertaining to alleged damage from Hurricane Eta. Universal raised several affirmative defenses, including Alvarez’s violation of her contractual post-loss obligations. At the start of trial, the court ruled that the legal presumption of prejudice was inapplicable to all of Universal’s post-loss obligation defenses except prompt notice. Universal opposed the ruling and continued to object at the charge conference.At trial, there was undisputed evidence that Alvarez failed to comply with multiple post-loss obligations, in addition to her failure to provide prompt notice, such as not providing requested documents and failing to preserve damaged property. Universal introduced a records request letter and testified that it never received the requested documents. Alvarez admitted she was aware of the records request, and that her uncle purchased materials and repaired the roof before Universal inspected it. Based on the court’s ruling at the start of trial, the jury was instructed that the presumption of prejudice only applied to Universal’s prompt notice defense and none of its other post-loss obligation defenses. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alvarez, and the court subsequently denied Universal’s post-trial motions. Universal appealed the trial court’s entry of final judgment and denial of its post-trial motions for directed verdict or a new trial. On appeal, Universal contended the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the presumption of prejudice.In reversing the trial court, the Third DCA looked to its prior holding in American Integrity Ins. Co. v. Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). ‘In Estrada, we held that “when an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative defense to coverage, and thereafter has subsequently established, that an insured has failed to substantially comply with a contractually mandated post-loss obligation, prejudice to the insurer from the insured's material breach is presumed, and the burden then shifts to the insured to show that any breach of post-loss obligations did not prejudice the insurer.”’ Alvarez, at 4 (quoting Estrada, at 916). ‘In reversing the trial court, we instructed, “If American Integrity establishes that Estrada failed to materially satisfy any contractually mandated post-loss obligations, then the burden shifts to Estrada to establish that American Integrity was not prejudiced by Estrada's breach.”’ Id., at 4 (quoting Estrada, at 917) (emphasis added).The Third DCA found that the evidence at trial was sufficient enough to have required the trial court to instruct the jury on Universal’s presumption of prejudice to all of its post-loss obligation defenses. Since the court’s instruction to the jury was an inaccurate statement of law, the Third DCA ruled the trial court committed reversible error, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Insurer’s Failure to Raise Deficiency in Civil Remedy Notice at Appropriate Stage Amounts to Waiver of Argument at Summary Judgment
March 1, 2026
Frisco v State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-0464 (Fla 2nd DCA December 3, 2025).The plaintiffs appealed a final summary judgment granted in favor of State Farm in their bad faith lawsuit. The Friscos filed a homeowner’s insurance claim based on damage due to a contractor’s faulty work and later, filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN), frustrated by State Farm’s claim handling. The Friscos then filed a breach of contract action and State Farm responded by demanding appraisal. The trial court ordered appraisal, and State Farm paid the award. State Farm, in responding to the CRN, never mentioned a perceived deficiency in the CRN for the insured’s demand for attorney’s fees and costs.The insureds then filed the bad-faith lawsuit. State Farm did not timely file an answer, following the parties’ agreed order for an extension of time to do so, but instead moved for dismissal, or alternatively, summary judgment. State Farm argued the CRN was deficient, but not because of the demand for attorney’s fees and costs. The court denied the motion, ordering State Farm to answer. In a renewed motion for summary judgment, State Farm argued, for the first time, that the CRN was deficient because it demanded as a cure “extra-contractual damages” in the form of attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the CRN was “legally deficient” because it “impermissibly required State Farm to pay extra-contractual damages, such as attorney’s fees and costs', contrary to Talat Enterprises, Inc. v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 753 So.2d. 1278 (Fla. 2000).On appeal, the Second DCA found that State Farm waived its right to argue the Friscos’ allegedly deficient CRN by failing to raise it in its response or any other time before arguing its motion for summary judgment, more than four years after the Friscos filed the CRN. The court noted the well settled law that an insurer who responds to the merits of a CRN without raising defects in the notice waives the right to make any such objection later.Judge Atkinson, who concurred in result only, noted that the majority failed to address the trial court’s alternative ground for its ruling: the Friscos did not file a reply to State Farm’s affirmative defenses, they were precluded from arguing at summary judgment that State Farm waived its defense regarding the sufficiency of the CRN. Atkinson noted that the trial court erred because State Farm never asserted an affirmative defense for this specific deficiency, so no reply was required. However, because the Friscos did not raise the issue on appeal that no reply was necessary, the party presentation principle prevented the court from considering such an argument. Nonetheless, Atkinson opined that the trial court’s granting of summary judgment was incorrect due to the precise CRN language on which summary judgment was premised was not supported by the language of the statute or any binding decisional authority. Atkinson stated that on the merits, the trial court was wrong to conclude that the CRN was “legally deficient” on the basis that it requires payment of “unrecoverable extra-contractual damages, such as attorney’s fees and costs.”Based on the statutory language and the Talat analysis, a determination of whether an insured has satisfied the condition precedent described in Fla. Stat. 624.155(3) is not contingent on the insured’s contractual entitlement to the demands contained in a civil remedy notice. There is no controlling case law supporting the proposition that the lack of merit of what an insured demands in a CRN renders the notice deficient.
Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Shareholder Class and Special Counsel Promotions
December 15, 2025
